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Crosslistings: PHIL 541 |
One of the most important topics in philosophy of mind is that of whether the characteristic features of the mind, such as consciousness, meaning and the first-person perspective, can be EXPLAINED in terms of the natural
sciences. Recent debate has
centered on two questions: 1) whether these features of the mind can be explained in naturalistic terms, and 2) whether we should take the METAPHYSICAL view that the mind is nothing but a complex physical system. In
this course we will attempt to clarify
what is at stake in contemporary debates over naturalism. We will examine several case studies in psychological explanation (psychophysics, color vision, computational psychology, the binding problem) to see just what
is and is not explained here, and
whether there is, as some philosophers have claimed, an "explanatory gap" between mind and world. We will then examine the implications of recent work in philosophy of science for the debate in philosophy of mind: e.g.,
why do philosophers of mind seem
trapped in the reductionist philosophy of science that was popular in the 1950's while philosophers of science have largely rejected it? Finally, we will examine the metaphysical implications of any explanatory gap
between mind and world.
NOTE:
This course will involve reading manuscript material by the instructor, and thus involve active participation in and critique of cutting-edge research in philosophy of mind.
Unless preregistered students attend the first class meeting or communicate directly with the instructor prior to the first class, they will be dropped from the class list. NOTE: Students must still submit a completed Drop/Add form to the Registrar's Office.
COURSE FORMAT: Seminar
Level: UGRD Credit: 1 Gen Ed Area Dept: HA PHIL Grading Mode: Student Option
Prerequisites: NONE
Last Updated on MAR-19-2002
Copyright Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, 06459